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RECENT DECISIONS
Administrative Law-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONs-WITNESS' TESTr-
MONY IN HEARING WHERE JUDICIAL SAFEGUARDS NOT PRESENT Lim-
ITED TO QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE FOR SLANDER.-Elder v. Holland, 208
Va. 15, 155 S.E. 2d 369 (1967).
Elder brought an action for slander against Holland, a state policeman,
arising out of the latter's testimony in a hearing conducted by the superin-
tendent of state police. The hearing had been called to determine the
propriety of Elder's dismissal from the force for alleged misconduct. Holland
demurred to Elder's bill of particulars2 which conceded that the testimony
was offered during a hearing. The trial court sustained the demurrer with-
out giving reasons. On appeal, held, reversed and remanded to give plaintiff
an opportunity to prove actual malice.' Although defendant's statement was
made in the course of a hearing, it was entitled to only a qualified privilege
under the law of libel and slander.
Statements by participants in both judicial4 and quasi-judicia 5 proceed-
ings are absolutely privileged for slander and libel.6 When a proceeding
I The plaintiff's action was also brought under the Statute of Insulting Words, VA.
CODE ANN. § 8-630 (1957), but ". . . this section is treated precisely the same as an
action for slander . . . for words actionable per se . . . except that no publication is
necessary." Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers, 196 Va. 1, 6, 82 S.E.2d 588, 591 (1954).
2 VA. SUP. Cr. App. R. 3:18(a): "All bills of particulars.., are pleadings."
3 Subsequent to the demurrer, the parties stipulated that the transcript of the hearing
.. insofar as . . . relevant . .. constitutes evidence . . . taken without objection and
available to . . . either party for any purpose before this court or upon appeal." Elder
v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 17, 155 S.E.2d 369, 371 (1967). The court held that the facts
disclosed by the transcript could be considered by it on appeal in ruling on the de-
murrer, citing Smith v. Wolsiefer, 119 Va. 247, 250, 89 S.E. 115, 116 (1916), where
the trial court's consideration of a deed of lease in ruling on a demurrer was upheld
since all the parties ". . . appear[ed] to have consented for the trial court to consider
[.. fit] as a part of the declaration." 208 Va. at 18, 155 S.E.2d at 372.
The court also held that defendant's status as an employee of the state did not
render him immune from liability for his intentional acts done in the course of employ-
ment.
4 Ginsberg v. Black, 192 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952),
reh. denied, 343 U.S. 958 (1952).
5Robertson v. Industrial Ins. Co., 75 So.2d 198, 45 A.L.R.2d 1292 (Fla. 1954);
Ranier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d 889 (1955).
6 "The [absolute] privilege extends [as well] to pleadings and other papers made a part
of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding even though such proceeding is in its prelimi-
nary stage and no formal judicial action has been taken." Ramstead v. Morgan, 219
Ore. 383, 347 P.2d 594, 599 (1959); Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Texas, 155
202
RECENT DECISIONS
is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial, the statements made therein are usually
held entitled to a qualified privilege for defamation, i.e., privileged in the
absence of actual malice.7 The absolute privilege in judicial and quasi-
judicial proceedings exists so long as the statement is relevant to the issue
at hand.8 An absolute privilege is accorded such statements because it is
felt that the need for free discussion to reach a just result outweighs the
attendant danger of defamation. 9 A "judicial proceeding" for the purpose
of granting an absolute privilege for defamation is a hearing before a court
of established jurisdiction and procedure to decide the rights of parties before
it.10 The term "quasi-judicial," and the concomitant absolute privilege for
S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), aff'd, 140 Tex. 105, 166 S.W.2d 909 (1942)
(written statement filed with insurance commissioner); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 587,
at 231 (1938); see Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 14 At. 518, 520 (1888) (petition
filed with court asking that party be punished for contempt); cf. RESTATEMENT, TORTS,
§ 586, at 229 (1938).
7 Story v. Norfolk Newspapers, Inc. 202 Va. 588, 590-91, 118 S.E.2d 668, 670 (1961):
'TI]f a communication is one of qualified privilege the onus is cast upon the person
claiming to have been defamed to prove the existence of [actual] malice." New
York Times Company v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964), states that "actual
malice" is present when the statement is made with actual knowledge of its falsity or
with reckless disregard of whether it is false.
While the factors entitling the statement to a qualified privilege are often not
spelled out, the decision to grant a qualified privilege is usually sustainable on at least
one ground, such as the fact that the statement: was made by a public officer in the
discharge of his official duty [City of Mullens v. Davidson, 133 W. Va. 557, 57 S.E.2d
1, 6 (1949)]; concerned the official conduct of a public official, [New York Times Com-
pany v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Reaves v. Foster, 200 So.2d 453, 456 (Miss.
1967)]; was made to a group of persons sharing with the publisher a common interest
in the subject matter [McKinnon v. Smith, 52 Misc. 2d 349, 275 N.Y.S. 2d 900 (1966);
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 596, at 255 (1938)]; was a comment on a matter of public
interest [RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 596, at 260-61 (1938)]. See generally PROSSER, TORTS
§ 110, at 805 (1964). See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), which makes
the qualified privilege for comment in the press on the official conduct of a public
official, granted in New York Times Company v. Sullivan, supra, applicable to a
criminal action for libel
8 Penick v. Ratcliffe, 149 Va. 618, 635, 140 S.E. 664, 669 (1927); Maulsby v. Reif-
snider, 69 Md. 143, 14 Atl. 505, 506-07 (1888); Burgess v. Turtle and Co., 155 Minn.
479, 193 N.W. 945, 947 (1923) suggests as a test of relevancy, "Was an allegation
so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter that no reasonable man could
doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety?" See also Annot., 123 Am. St. Rep. 631, 649
(1909), suggesting that the "privilege of a witness extends beyond that of counsel, for
it is not his business to consider whether the subject under inquiry is relevant or not ...
if no objection is made, or being made is overruled, it is the duty of the witness to
assume it is relevant . . 6 and for his answer he cannot be held liable ... " Contra
Matthis v. Kennedy, 67 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Minn Sup. Ct. 1954).
9 See Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 14 At. 518, 520 (1888); Ranier's Dairies v.
Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d 889, 891 (1955); Matthis v. Kennedy,
67 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Minn. 1954).
10 Penick v. Ratcliffe, 149 Va. 618, 628, 140 S.E. 664, 667 (1927).
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defamation, applies to those administrative and regulatory proceedings which
share with judicial proceedings safeguards tending to inhibit the making
of defamatory statements." One such safeguard is the mandatory require-
ment of attendance by witnessesa2 which aids in a thorough investigation
of the issues involved and enables the defamed party to face his accusers,
permitting him to vindicate himself in the same proceeding.13 The presence
of criminal liability for perjured testimony14 and the amenability of the
11 Engelmohr v. Bache, 66 Wash.2d 103, 401 P.2d 346, 347 (1965) (by implication);
Ranier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d 889, 894 (1955). But
see J. D. Construction Corp. v. Isaacs, 95 N.J. Super. Ct. 122, 230 A.2d 168 (1967), cert.
granted, 50 N.J. 290, 234 A.2d 399 (1967), an action for slander and libel arising out
of the contents of a letter sent by defendant to members of a township committee
charging plaintiff with improper conduct in connection with an application for a zoning
change. At a meeting of the township committee the letter was read aloud with de-
fendant's permission and thus made part of the proceedings. On appeal, the plaintiff
objected to the granting of an absolute privilege for defamation to the letter's contents
on the ground that the meeting had lacked judicial safeguards. Stating that defendant
had "read too much" into the requirement of Ranier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms,
supra, that a quasi-judicial proceeding must contain judicial safeguards, the court found
the hearing quasi-judicial for the following reasons: defendant could be regarded as a
"party," i.e., a participant, in the proceeding, since it was "appropraite" to have given
him notice and hearing, even though these were not in fact given him; a presiding
officer was in control of the meeting (nothing, however, is said regarding his powers over
the proceeding's participants) ; the decision was reviewable both on its law and facts by a
court; the subject matter of the hearing was quasi-judicial and of "substantial public
importance." The court prefaced its decision with the observation that the border separat-
ing quasi-judicial proceedings from other proceedings is a "penumbral" one. Should the
New Jersey Supreme Court sustain the lower court's decision, however, there will have
emerged a clear line dividing those jurisdictions which demand for a quasi-judicial pro-
ceeding the presence of some safeguards mitigating the danger of defamation from those
which are satisfied with the presence of other quasi-judicial features.
In Corbin v. Washington Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 278 F. Supp. 393
(D.C.S.C. 1968), the court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that its statement of facts in a private arbitration proceeding had been absolutely
privileged for libel. Noting the strong public policy in favor of settling disputes by
means of arbitration, the court stated that were such statements not so privileged, the
ensuing fear of defamation actions could hamper the development of a full record
which is necessary for effective arbitration. The court dismissed as unimportant the
fact that the arbitration proceeding had come about by private agreement rather than
under statute. Moreover, the absence of a hearing officer with supervisory power over
the proceedings would not negate the privilege, since even in a judicial proceeding the
scope of the privilege may extend beyond the court's power to restrain the participants.
12 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Texas v. Reagan, 155 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941), aff'd, 140 Tex. 105, 166 S.W.2d 909 (1942); Jenson v. Olson, 141 N.W.2d 488,
490 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1966). See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 588, comment a at 233 (1938),
"The compulsory attendance of witnesses makes the protection afforded the more
necessary." Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLUM.
L. REv. 463, 486 (1909).
13 Veeder, supra note at 486.
14See Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 14 Atl. 518, 520 (1888); RESTATEMENT,
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participants of the proceeding to contempt process 5 are other highly re-
garded safeguards which tend to keep statements within tolerable bounds
without unduly restricting free discussion.' 6 Another factor indicating that
a hearing is quasi-judicial is the availability to a defamed party of an
alternative remedy to an action for defamation.' 7 While malicious prosecu-
tion has been suggested as an alternative remedy,'8 not all jurisdictions permit
this action in response to every wrongfully instituted civil proceeding. 19
Also, it does not lie where the defendant can show probable cause for
initiating the proceeding, even though his subsequent testimony is deliber-
ately slanderous.2 Moreover, the availability of an action for malicious
prosecution presupposes both that the defaming party helped initiate or
encouraged the proceeding and that the party defamed therein was also
the defendant.2'
TORTS § 588, comment a at 233 (1938) ("The witness is subject to the control of the
trial judge in the exercise of the [absolute] privilege. For the abuse of it, he may be
subject to criminal prosecution for perjury and to punishment for contempt.") cited in
Jenson v. Olsen, 141 N.W.2d 488, 490 n.3 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1966); Veeder, supra note 12,
at 470.
15See Mills v. Denny, 245 Iowa 584, 63 N.W.2d 222, 225 (1954); RESTATEIENT,
TORTS § 588, comment a at 233 (1938). But see Ranier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley
Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d 889, 894 (1955).16 Veeder, supra note 12, at 470.
17 Mills v. Denny, 245 Iowa 584, 63 N.W.2d 222, 225 (1954); Veeder, supra note 12,
at 470. See also Harper, Malicious Prosecution, False Imprisonment and Defamation, 15
Tx. L. REv. 157 (1937).
18 Ranier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d 889, 896 (1955).
See also Novick v. Becker, 4 Wis. 2d 432, 90 N.W.2d 620 (1958). In Bartlett v.
Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 14 Adt. 518, 520 (1888), defendant's petition filed with court
was absolutely privileged as a statement made in the course of a judicial proceeding
and abuse of process was not available as an alternative remedy, regardless of the pe-
titioner's malice and knowledge of the falsity of its averments, since the petition was
filed for the very purpose for which such petition was intended to be used.
19 12 MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE, Malicious Prosecution § 15, at 319 (1950); "[The]
groundless and malicious institution of even civil suits will furnish a basis of action where
it is accompanied by arrest of the person, seizure of property, injury to business, or
other special damage.", citing National Surety Co. v. Page, 58 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1932),
reh. denied 59 F.2d 370 (1932). See also Petrich v. McDonald, 44 Wash.2d 211, 266
P.2d 1047, 1050, 1052 (1954) holding plaintiff could not recover in action for malicious
prosecution when he failed to show "special injury" (also called "special damage")
which the court said did not include any injury which is the "necessary result of all
similar suits."
20See PROSSER, TORTS § 113, at 852-53 & § 114, at 874 (1964).
21 See, PROSSER, TORTS § 113, at 854-55 (1964). See also Taplin-Rice-Clerkin Co. v.
Hower, 124 Ohio 123, 177 N.E. 203, 81 A.L.R. 1117 (1931) (testimony given before
a grand jury absolutely privileged and inadmissible in a subsequent action for malicious
prosecution).
In Ranier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d 889, 895 (1955),
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In addition to the foregoing tests courts have asked whether the proceed-
ing dealt with issues of significant public concern, but the presence of
such issues, without more, has not led them to find statements of its partici-
pants absolutely privileged.2 2 However, proceedings aimed at determining
whether a party's license to engage in certain activity should be granted,
suspended, or revoked have often been held to be of a quasi-judicial
nature. 23 The fact that a proceeding is conducted pursuant to statutory
provisions is often a significant factor, though not a decisive one.24 Proceed-
ings from which a party may appeal of right to a court of law have
generally been held to be quasi-judicial.'
Prior to Elder, in Lightner v. Osborn,26 plaintiff in a libel action had
sought to introduce defendant's testimony offered in a previous judicial
proceeding as evidence of his malice in making accusations in a letter whose
contents were covered by a qualified privilege. Holding the testimony from
the previous trial admissible, the court said defendant's privilege as a
witness had been a "limited" one 7 However, since the court found the
the court recognized approvingly that malicious prosecution is a more limited remedy
than slander or libel stating, "If the policy, which in defamation actions affords an
absolute privilege or immunity to statements made in judicial and quasi-judicial proceed-
ings is really to mean anything then we must not permit its circumvention by affording
an almost equally unrestricted action under a different label."
22 Compare Ranier's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d 889,
894 (1955); Lininger v. Knight, 123 Colo. 213, 226 P.2d 809, 813 (1951), with Engel-
mohr v. Bache, 66 Wash. 103, 401 P.2d 346 (1965); cf. Posnett v. Marble, 62 Vt. 481,
20 Atl. 813, 815 (1890); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 598, at 260 (1938).
23Robertson v. Industrial Ins. Co., 75 So.2d 198, 45 A.L.R.2d 1292 (Fla. 1954);
Powers v. Vaughan, 312 Mich. 297, 20 N.W 2d 196 (1945); Ranier's Dairies v. Raritan
Valley Farms, 19 N.J. 552, 117 A.2d 889 (1955); Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Texas
v. Reagan, 155 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), aff'd, 140 Tex. 105, 166 S.W.2d
909 (1942). But see Engelmohr v Bache, 66 Wash. 103, 401 P.2d 346 (1965); Meyer
v. Parr, 69 Ohio App. 344, 37 N.E.2d 637 (1941).
24 Compare Penick v. Ratcliffe, 149 Va. 618, 631, 140 S.E. 664, 668 (1927); Burgess v.
Turtle and Co., 155 Minn. 479, 193 N.W. 945, 947 (1923), with Engelmohr v. Bache,
66 Wash. 103, 401 P.2d 346 (1965), petition for cert. dismissed, 382 U.S. 950 (1965).
But see Meyer v. Parr, 69 Ohio App. 344, 37 N.E.2d 637 (1941).
25J. D. Construction Corp. v. Isaacs, 95 N.J. Super. Ct. 122, 230 A.2d 168, 172
(1967), cert. granted, 50 N.J. 290, 234 A.2d 399 (1967); Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
Texas v. Reagan, 155 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941), aff'd, 140 Tex. 105,
100 S.W.2d 909 (1942); cf. Veeder, supra note 12, at 486. Contra, Meyer v.
Parr, 69 Ohio App. 344, 37 N.E.2d 637, 640 (1941), where the court denied an absolute
privilege for defamation to an affidavit filed with the state board of embalmers. The
court stated that the provision for judicial review of contested cases in the statute creat-
ing the board did not mean that the board exercised "judicial power." Rather this pro-
vision was said to be a recognition that "under the due process clauses of the state
and federal constitutions it is not possible to confer absolute power upon executive or
administrative officers."
26 142 Va. 19, 127 S.E. 314 (1925).
2 7 Id. at 24, 127 S.E. at 316.
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testimony to have been irrelevant to the issues at the earlier hearing
wherein it was given, its holding was consistent with the existence of an
absolute privilege. 28 In the later case of Penick v. Ratcliffe, a petition filed
in a circuit court charging election irregularities formed the basis for a libel
action. Stating that the definition of a judicial proceeding was "broad and
comprehensive," the court held that, while the hearing was neither a suit
in equity nor an action at law, the petition's allegations were entitled to
an absolute privilege. 29 The Elder case presented for the first time in Virginia
the issue of whether to grant the absolute privilege to testimony in an ad-
ministrative hearing, and the court applied the criteria heretofore noted
in reaching its decision. The court stressed its uncertainty about whether
false testimony by any witness in the hearing could have made the latter
criminally liable for perjury.3 ° This uncertainty is justified in view of
Commonwealth v. Calvert where the quashing of an indictment for perjury
was upheld because the particular court did not have "legal and competent
authority" to administer the oath in question. 3' Assuming, arguendo, that
defendant's testimony at the superintendent's hearing was false, it is still
questionable whether it was material as required by the Virginia statute
defining perjury.32
The Elder court noted that attendance at the hearing had not been
mandatory and that the declarant, whose statement defendant claimed to be
repeating, had declined to attend.3 3 Also noting that the rules of evidence
had not been applied and that defendant's allegedly slanderous statement
was hearsay,3 the court contrasted the hearing with those held under the
General Administrative Agencies Act.35 In the latter hearings, witnesses
can be subpoenaed and hearsay testimony received only when a declarant
is not readily available as a witness and when judicial review is afforded.3 6
The court, however, expressly withheld opinion about whether a witness' tes-
timony in a hearing pursuant to this act would qualify for an absolute
privilege3 7 Calling attention to the hearsay nature of defendant's statement
served to dramatize the greater likelihood of defamatory statements oc-
28 Cases cited note 9 supra.
28 Cases cited note 9, supra.
30 208 Va. at 22, 155 S.E.2d at 374.
313 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 265, 267 (1809).
3 2 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-273 (1960). See Commonwealth v. Crump, 75 Va. 922
(1822).
33 208 Va. at 16, 155 S.E.2d at 374.
341 d. at 22, 155 S.E.2d at 374.
35 VA. COD, ANN. §§ 9-6.1 to -6.14 (1964).
36VA. CODnANN. §§ 9-6.10, 9-6.11 & 9-6.13 (1964).
37 208 Va. at 22 n. 3, 155 S.E.2d at 374 n. 3.
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curring in proceedings where the rules of evidence are not applied. Doubt-
less, the court did not mean to suggest that a witness' testimony ceases to
be absolutely privileged when it transgresses so technical an evidence rule,
since this would inhibit the flow of free discussion which the absolute privi-
lege seeks to encourage.
In Allen v. Crofoot, a New York court held that slanderous testimony is
absolutely privileged even though not given in a judicial proceeding pro-
vided the defaming party reasonably believes such a proceeding is in prog-
ress.3 8 Similarly, conceding that the hearing involved in Elder was not quasi-
judicial, there remains the issue of whether the defendant was justified in
believing it to be such in view of its ostensible features: plaintiff was repre-
sented at the hearing by counsel; an Assistant Attorney-General represented
the Commonwealth's interests ;39 all testimony was given under oath, trans-
cribed by a court reporter,4° and subject to cross-examination. 41 In dictum
the Penick court had noted sympathetically that "witnesses who detail their
own version of facts seldom pause to ponder the jurisdiction of the court," 42
but the Elder court apparently viewed the issue as mooted here by the
presiding officer's warning at the outset of the proceeding that it was "not
a hearing before a Court of law." 43
Discrimination-HosPITALS-ANY SEGREGATION OF PATIENTS BY RACE
WITHIN WARDS OF A PUBLICLY SUPPORTED HOSPITAL Is A PATENT
VIOLATION OF THE LAW.-QUALIFIED NEGRO PHYSICIANS SHALL NOT
BE DENIED STAFF PRIVILEGES AT A PUBLICLY SUPPORTED HOSPITAL
BECAUSE OF THEIR RACE. Cypress v. Newport News General and Non-
sectarian Hospital Association, 375 F. 2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967).
A Negro physician's application for staff privileges at defendant hospital
was rejected by a secret ballot vote of the all-white staff, although he
was ostensibly well qualified. The hospital, which received substantial fed-
38 2 Wend. (N.Y.) 515, 20 Am. Dec. 647 (1829); see Harper, Privileged Defamation,
22 VA. L. Rav. 642, 649-50 (1936):
In practically all cases of privilege in the law of torts the existence of a privilege
depends upon facts as they appear to the person whose liability is in question....
In the law of defamation it would be extraordinary if the facts as they reasonably
appeared to the defendant would not beget the privilege.
39 Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 16, 155 S.E.2d 370-71 (1967).
40 Ibid.
41 Record, Vol. 208, Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 155 S.E.2d 369 (1967)
42 Penick v. Ratcliffe, 149 Va. 618, 631, 140 S.E. 664, 668 (1927).
43 Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 22, 155 S.E.2d 369, 374 (1967).
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eral and state aid under the Hill-Burton Act,1 also segregated patients
within its wards and rooms by race. The physician and two of his patients
brought a class action to enjoin the racially discriminatory policies and
practices of the defendant hospital in Newport News, Virginia; specifically:
(1) from segregating races within individual wards and rooms, and (2)
from denying staff privileges to qualified Negro physicians. The district
court denied relief 2 On appeal, held, reversed and remanded for the entry
of an order of injunctive relief. Segregation of the races within wards of
publicly supported hospitals is unconstitutional, moreover, qualified Negro
physicians shall not be denied staff privileges at a publicly supported hospital
because of their race.3
Since the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board
of Education,4 courts have held compulsory segregation of the races in
a variety of situations to be a violation of the rights guaranteed by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.5 Hospitals which receive substantial
1 60 Stat. 1041 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1964). Grants are made by
the federal government to public and private hospitals to assist in the construction
of new hospital facilities. These grants are made in accordance with a statewide plan
submitted by an authorized state agency after it has made an inventory of existing
needs and developed construction priorities according to federal standards. In several
previous cases, a hospital's participation in the Hill-Burton federal-state aid program
has been held to bring it within the purview of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments'
prohibition against racial discrimination. Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir.
1964); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963); Greisman
v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963)2 Cypress v. Newport News Gen. and Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 251 F. Supp. 667
(E.D. Va. 1966).
3 The court, per Sobeloff, J., held that, since the hospital had not given a reasonable
explanatiop showing that the denial of staff privileges was not based on the race of the
applicant, that an inference of racial discrimination had not been rebutted. The infer-
ence was compelled by the fact that seventy per cent of the white physicians in the
community were members of the hospital staff (a prerequisite for admitting their
patients), while none of the Negro physicians were. Cypress follows a line of recent
cases holding likewise. Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189
(4th Cir. 1966) (School teachers who were dismissed without explanation showed that
they had all the objective qualifications. The burden of proof was then on the school
board to produce evidence meriting dismissal.); Hawkins v. North Carolina Dental
Soc'y, 355 F.2d 718 (4th Cir. 1966), noted in 65 MIcH. L. REv. 549 (1967) (Where
two doctors on an all-white staff of the dental society had to recommend new mem-
bers, Negro applicants were unduly burdened, but not white applicants.); see Note,
Racial Integration of Professional Associations, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 490 (1965); and
Note, Working Rules For Assuring Nondiscrimination In Hospital Administration, 74
YALE L. J. 151 (1964).
4347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (anti-miscegenation statutes); Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (housing); Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526
(1963) (public parks and playgrounds); Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960)
1968]
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federal or state aid have previously been held to come within the purview
of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the laws. 6 Most previous decisions have dealt with
segregation in "hospital facilities" offered to patients seeking admission.7
These decisions have uniformly held that patients of both races must be
admitted without racial discrimination to hospitals which are publicly sup-
ported. The principal case concerns another problem, namely, the patient's
rights after admission to the hospital. More precisely, the question is
whether one's constitutional rights have been violated if, after being admitted
to a racially integrated hospital, he is placed in a ward exclusively with
members of his own race. Cypress holds that this is unconstitutional racial
discrimination per se. Yet a hospital patient has another possibly conflicting
right-that of a reasonable degree of care from his physician and the
hospital in providing for his recovery; specifically, in providing surrounding
conditions which promote the equanimity necessary for convalescence and
recovery. 8
Only two cases other than Cypress have dealt specifically with the narrow
issue of discrimination within individual wards after admission to the hos-
pital. In Rackley v. Board of Trustees of the Orangeburg Regional Hos-
pital,9 the Court conceded that "psychological factors are an important
element in patient recovery," 10 but added, nevertheless, that "[r]acial classi-
fications are irrelevant and invidious." " The court also said that "[jiustifi-
cation to segregate on the basis of alleged . . . 'differences' is no longer
(seating in courtrooms); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d
836 (5th Cir. 1966) (collecting cases on school desegregation).6 Eaton v. Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem.
Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963); Greisman v. Newcomb Hosp., 40 N.J. 389, 192
A.2d 817 (1963).
7 Flagler Hosp., Inc. v. Hayling, 344 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1965); Lewter v. Lee Mem.
Hosp. No. 65-47-Civ. T. (M.D. Fla. 1965), 11 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1425; Eaton v
Grubbs, 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964); Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp., 323 F.2d
959 (4th Cir. 1963); Meltsner, Equality and Health, 115 U. PA. L. Rnv. 22, 28 (1966).
8 Cf. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. R.v. 549
(1959); Note, Hospital Tort Liability and Immunity, 49 VA. L. Rv. 622 (1963).
9 238 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.S.C. 1965), 10 RACE REL. L. REP. 297.
lId. at 518, 10 RAcE REL. L. REP. at 302, citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
11 Id. at 519, 10 RACE REL. L. REP. at 302. This unbending principle of law was
first used in a 1944 case involving a labor contract and the phrase actually used was,
"Here the discriminations based on race alone are obviously irrelevant and invidious."
(Emphasis added.) Steele v. Louisville and Nashville Ry. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944).
This phrase, although frequently misapplied, became extremely popular after the Steele
decision. It has since been used in at least two school cases, Goss v. Board of Educ., 373
U.S. 683, 687 (1963), and Randall v. Sumter School Dist. No. 2, 232 F. Supp. 786,
789 (E.D.S.C. 1964). Rackley quoted the phrase, citing Randall as its source.
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permissible; the issue is no longer litigable."'2 (Emphasis added.) Although
it is debatable whether school desegregation cases are in point,13 the Court
relied on many of them in enjoining the defendant hospital from maintaining
racially segregated wards.
In Cypress, Judge Bryan dissented in part,'4 stating that a doctor's pro-
fessional obligation to provide for a patient's recovery should be allowed
to override the general policy of integration in certain cases. Where integra-
tion of the races within a hospital room would be injurious to the condition
of either a white or a Negro patient because of actual although unfounded
prejudice, a physician, using his professional discretion, should be allowed
to place the patient in a room with members of his own race.
The other case on discrimination within wards after admission to the
hospital lends support to Judge Bryan's view. In Rax v. State Department
of Hospitals,15 the Court ordered the defendant hospital to cease and
desist from maintaining segregation of the races in any part of the hospital,
including wards. The Court went one step further and added:
[Nothing herein contained shall operate to or be construed as prohibiting
the re-assignment of any patient, following such patient's admission ...
on an individual case basis, to a different ward, room, or residential area,
where such re-assignment is made by the patient's physician or physicians
based solely upon therapeutic, medical or psychiatric considerations and
evaluations in the best interest of the patient.16
In the principal case it was said that a hospital has practiced unconsti-
tutional racial discrimination per se if it places Negro patients in one ward
121d. at 519, quoting Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 687 (1963).13 The Supreme Court said in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, that separate
educational facilities were inherently unequal. Separate schools cannot have the same
teachers or even equal teachers, but hospital wards can have the same nurses and doctors.
Furthermore, students racially segregated in schools are denied the opportunity of com-
munication and association, an integral element of education guaranteed by the
Constitution. Patients in hospitals, on the other hand, seemingly could receive
treatment or convalesce equally well without communication or discussion among them-
selves. Education is a process of interaction, whereas patient treatment is administered
to individuals, not en masse. Therefore, there may be a denial of a necessary element
in education where schools are racially segregated but a denial of no element of treat-
ment where hospital wards are segregated in a racially integrated hospital. Thus, cases
which deal with constitutional rights in schools may not be applicable to controversies
which arise in facilities operated for other purposes. C. Nichols v. McGhee,
169 F. Supp. 721, 724 (N.D. Cal.), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 6 (1959).
14 Cypress v. Newport News Gen. and Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 661
(1967).
15 Civ. Action No. 3265 (E.D. La. 1965), 11 RAcE REL. L. REP. 384.
16 Id. at 385.
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and white patients in another. In addition, relying on a recent Alabama
case holding the segregation of prisoners unconstitutional, 17 Judge Sobeloff,
writing for the majority, states:
Any distinction made on the basis of race in a publicly supported insti-
tution is a patent violation of the law, not to be tolerated by a court
that is controlled by the Constitution of the United States.18
He then concludes that, if the Constitution will not tolerate racial seg-
regation of prisoners, then it would more emphatically deny segregation
of patients in a publicly supported hospital. 19 Prison cases should be
more persuasive in hospital litigation than school cases are. The purposes
of the two former institutions are somewhat similar, one being to provide
for recovery, the other for rehabilitation. As in hospital cases, the prison
cases hold that arbitrary racial discrimination is unconstitutional.20 Most
of these cases concede, however, that racial segregation in prisons is neces-
sary and not forbidden by the Constitution under certain circumstances,
namely, when necessitated to insure security and discipline.2 By analogous
reasoning, the Rax decision 22 and Judge Bryan's dissent23 conclude that
there are exceptions to constitutional guarantees in hospitals also.
17 Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
18 Cypress v. Newport News Gen. and Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 656
(4th Cir. 1967).
19 Ibid. n. 15.
20Toles v. Katzenbach, 385 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1967); Board of Managers of the
Ark. Training School for Boys v. George, 377 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1967); Washington
v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Nichols v.
McGhee, 169 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal. 1959), appeal dismissed, 361 U.S. 6 (1959); see
Comment, The Rights of a Prisoner While Incarcerated, 15 Buffalo L. Rev. 397 (1965).
21 Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968), aff'g 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala.
1966). In a per curiam opinion, the Court stated that it found the district court's
opinion "unexceptionable." The district court opinion upon which the court relied in
Cypress conceded that "there was merit in the contention that in some isolated instances
prison security and discipline necessitates segregation of the races for a limited period."
A separate concurring opinion by Justices Black, Harland, and Stewart stated that"prison authorities have the right, acting in good faith and in particularized circum-
stances, to take into account racial tensions in maintaining security, discipline, and good
order in prisons and jails." Accord, Toles v. Katzenbach, 385 F.2d 107, 109 (1967);
Board of Managers of the Ark. Training School for Boys v. George, 377 F.2d 228, 232
(8th Cir. 1967); Nichols v. McGhee, 169 F. Supp. 721, 725 (N.D. Cal. 1959), appeal
dismissed, 361 U.S. 6 (1959); see Comment, The Rights of a Prisoner While In-
carcerated, 15 BUFFALO L. Rxv. 397, 417 (1965).
22Rax v. State Dept. of Hosp., Civ. Action No. 3265 (E.D. La. 1965), 11 RAcF REL.
L. REP. 384.
23 Cypress v. Newport News Gen. and Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 661
(4th Cir. 1967).
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The majority of the cases in the field of prisons and some of those involv-
ing hospitals seem to be developing a doctrine reminiscent of Justice Holmes'
"clear and present danger" test applied in a different context. Thus, the
application of the Court's stringent interpretation of the Constitution in the
principal case is apparently not in accord with the weight of authority.
Municipal Corporations-STAmNG TO SuE-RIGHT OF LOCAL TAX-
PAYERS TO CHALLENGE EXPENDITURES OF PUBLIC FuNDs. Gordon v.
Board of Supervisors, 207 Va. 827, 153 S.E. 2d 270 (1967).
Plaintiffs filed a bill of complaint in a declaratory judgment proceeding,
on behalf of themselves and all other taxpayers similarly situated, to chal-
lenge the statutory power of the Board of Supervisors' to lend money to
the Fairfax County Airport Authority.2 The trial court dismissed plaintiffs'
complaint and they appealed. On appeal, the Board challenged plaintiffs'
standing to appeal. Held, taxpayers not only have standing to challenge an
expenditure of public funds by a locality,3 but also have standing to appeal.4
Although taxpayers do not presently have standing to challenge the
expenditure of funds by the federal government,5 they can challenge state
24 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1918).
1 Va. Acts of Assembly 1964, ch. 642, at 967-75.
2 This Authority was created by the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors under power
vested in it by the Act, supra note 1, with the purpose of planning, financing, and ac-
quiring property for an airport. The Gordons and other landowners were enjoined in
a prior suit from obstructing Authority representatives who desired to make tests on
their lands. The Gordons unsuccessfully maintained that the Authority could not com-
pensate them for any damages caused by the tests. Although the Gordons had an indi-
vidual economic interest as landowners in the prior suit, and they mentioned this interest
in seeking standing to appeal in the present appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals
appraised appellants' standing as a taxpayer and not as a landowner. It was upon this
taxpayer interest that they were granted standing to appeal.
3 Surveys of taxpayer suits note no difference between suits against counties and
municipal corporations (both hereinafter referred to as "locality"). See Comment,
Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L. REv. 895, 896 n. 7 (1960); Note,
Taxpayer's Suits as a Means of Controlling the Expenditure of Public Funds, 50 HARv.
L. REV. 1276 n. 5 (1937). No distinction can be found in Virginia.
4Tle Court also held that 1) the prior injunction suit by the Authority was not res
judicata as to whether the Board had authority to lend the Authority money; 2) Va.
Acts of Assembly 1966, ch. 132, at 231, which allows a local government to lend money
to any Authority it created, did not retroactively cure the Board's inability to loan
money under the 1964 Act, supra note 1; 3) although the Board did not have express
power to lend, such power would be inferred from the 1964 Act, for without it the
Authority would be ineffective.
5 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). A federal taxpayer, because of his
remote economic interest, does not have standing to challenge federal expenditures
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expenditures in at least thirty-four states,6 and local expenditures in almost
which would increase the burden of future taxation and thereby take his property without
due process of law. But see United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), and Cincinnati
Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937), where earmarking of the proceeds of a
particular tax was said to establish a basis in a taxpayer's suit for judicial review of the
validity of that particular expenditure. Authorities have criticized Frothingham. See, e.g.,
Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental Action, 39 MINN. L. REv. 353, 387-91 (1955) ;
Jaffee, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. Rav. 1265,
1294 (1961). In Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1, (S.D.N.Y. 1967), petition for appeal
filed, 36 U.S. L. WEEK 3061 (U.S. July 25, 1967) (No. 416), taxpayers who are con-
testing federal expenditures as violative of the Establishment Clause attack the Froth-
ingham standing requirements. Professor Lewis in Constitutional Rights and the Misuse
of "Standing," 14 STAN. L. REv., 433, 436-41 (1962), suggests that federal taxpayers
might establish standing to obtain judicial review of federal expenditures by proving an
actual invasion of a constitutionally protected interest. Such a method of establishing
standing might circumvent the Frothingham standing requirements which Professor
Sutherland finds modified by the impact of Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARV. L. REv. 25, 26 (1962).
6 Comment, 69 YALE L. REv., supra note 3, at 895 n. 6. Although Virginia taxpayers
have not been granted express standing to challenge state actions, several decisions indicate
that such standing might exist. A joint suit may be brought by two or more parties
of a class for the benefit of all those similarly situated. Bull v. Read, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.)
78 (1855). A suit against a state officer is not necessarily a suit against the state.
Blanton v. Southern Fertilizing Co., 77 Va. (2 Hans.) 335 (1883). When a Virginia
corporation sought to enjoin state officials on behalf of all other Virginia taxpayers from
acting under a statute, the question of standing to sue was not raised. Shenandoah Lime
Co. v. Governor, 115 Va. 865, 80 S.E. 753 (1914). The Supreme Court of Appeals has
allowed a Virginia county, as representative of milk consuming inhabitants to challenge
an order of the State Milk Commission, in an unreported per curiam decision filed
January 26, 1953, aff'd per curiam, 346 U.S. 932 (1954), discussed in Note, The Supreme
Court, 1953 Term, 68 HARv. L. REV. 96, 132 (1954).
These cases form a foundation upon which a taxpayer's standing to challenge mis-
appropriation of state funds could be based. This standing could be created in several
ways: 1) allow taxpayers in a class action to challenge state expenditures; 2) alternatively,
if taxpayers themselves are not given standing, allow local governments to challenge
expenditures on their behalf; 3) establish that taxpayer suits are not directed against the
state itself, but against state officials who misuse funds, thus avoiding the immunity
problem. State immunity from suits which are instituted without express consent of the
state should not extend to suits against individuals who illegally invade or threaten
to invade pecuniary or property rights of taxpayers, even though they purport to act
under state authority. E.g., Terr v. Jordon, 232 N.C. 48, 59 S.E.2d 359 (1950). The
need for taxpayer suits as a means to remedy illegal action by state officials continues
due to the failure of the election process, public prosecution, and public exposure to
provide a satisfactory substitute.
True, the taxpayer's contribution to the state treasury may be a lesser percentage
of the total than his municipal tax payments, and his interest in state affairs might
therefore be said to be more remote. But no overriding considerations-such as
the need for executive flexibility on the national level in foreign affairs and de-
fense-make review of state action less desirable than review of the affairs of local
government.
69 YALE L. REv. at 902.
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every jurisdiction.7 A Virginia taxpayer, who has suffered no out-of-pocket
loss, may sue on behalf of a locality to recover funds which have been
misappropriated by an individual public official, subject to the requirement
that he first request the locality to sue and that it refused, or allege facts
to show that such a request would be unavailing8 Local taxpayers without
special interest do not have standing in equity to challenge land assessment
reports in condemnation proceedings, 9 remove tie breakers from county board
of supervisors, 10 or challenge the selection of school sites." In such suits,
taxpayers lack standing because of insufficient injury from the challenged
act.12 However, taxpayers do have standing to enjoin a locality itself
from making unauthorized appropriations of local funds,13 or illegal disposi-
tions of local property. 14 But they could not appeal if the only wrong
7 Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601 (1879). For a collection of cases and jurisdic-
tional holdings, see Comment, 69 YALE; L. REv. supra note 3, at 895 n.7. See also 4 DIL-
LON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1579-91 at 2763-91 (5th ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited
as DILLON]; 2 ANTIEAu, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAWv § 16.16-17, at 503-14 (1967) (tax-
payer suits against municipal corporations) [hereinafter cited as ANTiEAU]; 4 ANTIEAU
§ 40.07, at 254-57 (taxpayer suits against counties); RHYME, MUNICIPAL LAw § 31-3, at
792-94 (1967); 18 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 52.02 (3rd ed. 1950);
Jaffee, supra note 5, at 1265.
8 Sauer v. Moore, 171 Va. 421, 199 S.E. 487 (1938), discussed in 2 ANTIEAU § 16.14
at 496 & n. 46.
9 Culpeper v. Gorrell, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 484 (1871).
10 Nicholas v. Lawrence, 161 Va. 589, 171 S.E. 673 (1933).
11 Brown v. Baldwin, 112 Va. 536, 72 S.E. 143 (1911).
12 The interest required for Virginia taxpayer standing today is the product of stand-
ards demanding an economic injury produced by the misuse of public funds. The parties
who sued in cases cited in notes 9, 10, and 11, supra, lacked this interest. There has
been no recent litigation to allow the Supreme Court of Appeals to reappraise the
interest required for taxpayer standing. The current trend in other jurisdictions, how-
ever, is to recognize that a taxpayer has an interest in good government, and that
courts should protect this interest by judicial review of local actions without a showing
of substantial impact on interests personal to the taxpayers. Note, City Government in
the State Courts, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1596 (1965). In recognizing this trend, Gordon
might indicate a relaxation of requirements for taxpayer standing which would expand
the field of illegal local actions which taxpayers can challenge.
13 Bull v. Read, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 78, 86 (1855). See also, Campbell v. Bryant,
104 Va. 509, 52 S.E. 638 (1905); Johnson v. Black, 103 Va. 477, 49 S.E. 633 (1905);
Lynchburg & Rivermont St. R. R. Co. v. Dameron, 95 Va. 545, 28 S.E. 951 (1898);
Redd v. Supervisors of Henry Cty., 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 695 (1879); Eyre v. Jacob,
Sheriff, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 423 (1858); Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6
Rand.) 245 (1828); Goddin v. Crump, 35 Va. (8 Leigh) 120 (1837). For the ad-
vantages of suing in equity, see Shenandoah Valley R.R. Co. v. Supervisors of Clarke
Cty., 78 Va. (3 Hans.) 269 (1884). For alternative methods of challenging local
actions, see 4. DILLON § 1570-1601.
14Roper v. McWhorter, 77 Va. (2 Hans.) 214 (1883) (standing to sue municipality
for illegal disposition of its property). See Appalachian Elec. Co. v. Town of Galax,
173 Va. 329, 4 S.E.2d 390 (1939) (standing to sue for illegal disposition of funds);
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they sustained was that in common with all other taxpayers.15 This appeal
prerequisite is now rejected in Virginia in favor of identical requirements
for standing to sue and standing to appeal.16
Equity has jurisdiction when a proper party seeks to enjoin the unlawful
acts of local officials.17 A taxpayer's standing as a proper party has been
based on the economic threat of an unjustified increase in his tax burden,18
and by analogy to a shareholder in a private corporation.19 The most
persuasive argument for taxpayer standing, however, is the lack of other
effective alternatives to control local misappropriation of funds, which are
necessitated by distrust of self-restraint on the part of the locality in the
use of its spending power. This necessity seems to outweigh the threat of
over-burdening court dockets. A taxpayer's standing effectuates a system
of checks and balances which places official action under the scrutiny of
judicial review. 2° Such suits are designed to enable representative class
actions brought on behalf of all taxpayers to challenge governmental action
which otherwise would go unchallenged.21 It would be as unreasonable
to demand that a taxpayer sue only for his minute portion of illegally ex-
pended funds as it would be to require all taxpayers to join in a suit. One
authority has suggested that there should be a single form of citizen action,
Lynchburg & Rivermont St. R.R. Co. v. Dameron, 95 Va. 545, 28 S.E. 951 (1898)
(standing to sue for illegal creation of a debt), cited in 13 MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE,
Municipal Corporations, § 131, at 491 nn.3 & 4 (1951) ; Vaughan v. Town of Galax, 173
Va. 335, 4 S.E.2d 386 (1939), and Cundiff v. Jeter, 172 Va. 470, 2 S.E.2d 436 (1939)
(Taxpayers have standing to challenge elections held for determining whether bonds
should be issued as illegal.).
15 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-462 (3) (C) (1957) provides in part that "... any person think-
ing himself aggrieved . . . by any final judgment, decree, or order in any civil case,
may appeal" (emphasis added). If the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Appeals
to hear an appeal is questioned, an appellant must show that he is such a "person."
The degree of interest required to make an appellant a person within the purview of
§ 8-462(3) (c) has varied with judicial interpretation. "Person" was first defined as one
having a collateral interest in the suit. Sayre v. Grymes, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 403
(1807). Subsequently, it was interpreted to mean an individual with a substan-
tial, immediate, pecuniary interest exceeding that of the ordinary taxpayer. Nicholas
v. Lawrence, 161 Va. 589, 171 S.E. 673 (1933). The Nicholas interpretation
of person destroyed a taxpayer's power to appeal a challenge of illegal local expenditures.
Gordon resolved the conflict by defining a person under § 8-462(3) (c) as one who
has standing to sue in the lower court. Thus, having standing to sue, a taxpayer can
initiate a suit without fear of having insufficient interest to appeal.16 Gordon v. Board of Supervisors, 207 Va. 827, 153 S.E.2d 270 (1967).
17 A proper party is one with sufficient individual interest to justify standing in court.
Note, 50 HARV. L. REV. supra note 3, at 1276.1 8 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 486-87.
19 4 DILLON § 1580.
20 Note, 78 HARV. L. REV., supra note 12.
21 Howard v. City of Boulder, 132 Colo. 401, 290 P.2d 237, 238 (1955).
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which would be competent to test state and local official conduct whethex
or not the relief sought is positive (mandamus) or negative (injunction) in
form.2 Virginia has not reached this point, but Gordon has firmly en-
trenched the taxpayer's standing to challenge local expenditures without
fear of having insufficient interest to appeal. The principal case also suggests
similar decisions in suits against the state for illegal expenditure of public
funds.
Taxatin-EXEMPTION-LEASEHOLD IN TAX EXEMPT LAND SUBJECT TO
TAX IF USED FOR PRIVATE OR COMMERCIAL PURPOSE-AGREEMENT IN
LIEU OF TAXES UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Chesapeake Industrial Development
Authority v. Suthers, 208 Va. 51, 155 S.E. 2d 326 (1967).
The Chesapeake Industrial Development Authority was created by the
City Council of Chesapeake, Virginia, under an enabling act passed by the
Virginia General Assembly.' The aim of the Authority was to encourage
industry to locate in the Chesapeake area. To further their goal, the Au-
thority purchased a suitable tract of land and entered into a twenty-five
year lease with an out-of-state industry. 2 The land was to be paid for by
revenue bonds issued in the Authority's name,3 and the lessee agreed to
22 Jaffee, supra note 5, at 1296.
1 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1373 through 15.1-1390 (1964) (Additional Supp. 1966).
In the words of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, "The Act authorizes the
governing body of any county, city, or town to create by ordinance an industrial devel-
opment authority as a political subdivision of the Commonwealth, with such public and
corporate powers as are set forth in the Act to acquire, own, lease, and dispose of
properties for the promotion of industry and the development of trade in such county,
city, or town." Chesapeake Industrial Development Authority v. Suthers, 208 Va. 51,
52, 155 S.E.2d 326, 328 (1967).
2 This Authority succeeded to the interest of the Chesapeake Port and Industrial
Authority (which had originally encouraged the out-of-state industry to locate in Vir-
ginia) in an Interim Financing Agreement. The agreement specified that the Virginia
National Bank would lend two million dollars to the Authority to pay for the land,
and the Authority would repay the Bank from the proceeds of the sale of tax-exempt
revenue bonds.
3 Revenue bonds were to be issued in the amount of three million dollars to be secured
by an Indenture of Mortgage and Deed of Trust. With the bonds in the Authority's
name and payable from a fund established by the lessee's rental payments, they constituted
a debt of the Authority and not the City of Chesapeake. This fully satisfies the Credit
Clause of § 185 of the Constitution of Virginia. VA. CONST. art. XIII, § 185 (1902).
Chesapeake Industrial Development Authority v. Suthers, 208 Va. 51, 57, 58, 155
S.E.2d 326, 332 (1967); Button v. Day, 208 Va. 494, 500, 158 S.E.2d 735, 739 (1968)
(dictum).
Tax-exempt industrial revenue bond financing is an accepted practice in most states
today. See generally Pinsky, State Constitutional Limitations On Public Industrial Fi-
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pay a fixed amount of rent in lieu of, and equal to, local property taxes
to the Authority.4 In order to insure the sale of the revenue bonds by testing
the Constitutionality of the Acts creating the Authority,5 its Chairman re-
fused to sign the lease, and the Authority brought a writ of mandamus to
force his signature. 6 Held, writ of mandamus denied. Although the land
itself may be tax-exempt, a leasehold interest whose beneficial use is for
private or commercial purposes is subject to taxation, and any Act which
provides for an agreement in lieu of taxes is unconstitutional.
Historically, commercial leaseholds severed from the public domain have
been held the proper subject of taxation.7 Even under the interdiction of
McCulloch v. Maryland,8 the Supreme Court of the United States has
held that land leased by the Federal Government for commercial purposes,
may be subjected to a state tax based on the value of 'the land.9 The Su-
preme Court hinges its decisions on the amount of control exercised by
the Federal Government over the leased property. With a limited amount
of governmental control, the leased property may be taxed, even though
the burden of the tax ultimately falls on the government. 10
In Virginia, the localities are the recipients of real estate taxes,11 and prior
to 1955, they were unable to tax a leasehold interest because it was a chattel
nancing: A Historical and Economic Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 265 (1963);
Note, The Public Purpose of Municipal Financing For Industrial Development, 70 YALE
L. J. 789 (1961); Spiegel, Financing Private Ventures With Tax Exempt Bonds: A
Developing "Truckhole" In The Tax Law, 17 STAN. L. REV. 223 (1965). For a brief
discussion of Virginia's attitude, see Harris & Russell, Taxation, 1966-1967 Annual
Survey of Virginia Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 1844, 1853 (1967).
4 Pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1382 (1964) (Additional Supp. 1966), which
reads in part:
Included in the rental payments to be made by any lessee to the authority shall
be an amount in lieu of and equal to local property taxes and assessments upon
property of the authority so leased. . . . Notwithstanding anything contained
herein to the contrary, the authority and the political subdivision in which all or
any part of the property for a particular facility of the authority is located may
agree at any time to a definite sum to be paid as local property taxes and assess-
ments throughout the duration of the lease of a particular project.
5 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1382 (1964) (Additional Supp. 1966).
6 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-714 (1957). The Attorney General is given statutory
authority to bring a writ of mandamus to require an officer of the State to perform his
official statutory function. The officer, in refusing to act, questions the validity of the
statute, thereby bringing its constitutionality before the Court. Almond v. Day, 197
Va. 782, 785, 91 S.E.2d 660, 661 (1956).
7 Trimble v. Seattle, 231 U.S. 638, 690 (1914) ; see Annot., 23 A.L.R. 248, 250 (1923).
817 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
9 United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958).
10 United States v. Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484, 486 (1958); accord, United States v.
Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 46 (1964).
11VA. CONST. art. XIII, § 171 (1902) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 58-9 (1959).
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real and taxed as personalty.12 At that time the term "taxable real estate"
was redefined to include ". . . a leasehold interest in every case in which the
land . . . [was] exempt from assessment for taxation to the owner." 13
To complicate matters, however, the Virginia Constitution provides that all
land owned directly or indirectly by the State is tax exempt,14 and, before
1955 there had been no determination of what indirect ownership meant.1 s
If the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia had decided that a leasehold
interest for private or commercial purposes in state land was owned in-
directly by the State, the localities would still be unable to tax this interest,
and one of the beneficial effects of the 1955 Amendment would be nullified.
In several recent decisions, the Supreme Court of Appeals eliminated
the ambiguity. The Court defined indirect ownership by the State as owner-
ship in that property whose "beneficial use is vested in a public corporation
created, managed, and controlled by the State." 16 In applying this defini-
tion, the Court has determined that there must be substantial state control
before there is indirect ownership. 17 Specifically, the Court held that a lease-
hold owned by private individuals and leased to them by a State hospital,
was subject to local property taxes, even though the hospital had dictated
the use of the property.18
The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals extended the above reasoning
to the Suthers decision, thereby further enlarging the scope of "taxable
real estate." To arrive at their decision, the Court held a statute providing
for rental payments in lieu of taxes unconstitutional, even though the pay-
ments were to be equal to local property taxes.19 What gave impetus to
the Court's decision was further statutory language providing for an
agreement between the municipality and the Authority, as to the amount
of local property taxes to be paid by the lessee.20 The Court reasoned that,
12 See Prince William County v. Thomason Park, 197 Va. 861, 867, 868, 91 S.E.2d
441, 446 (1956); Sager, Property Classification For Taxation, 43 VA. L. REv. 1323,
1332 (1957).
13 VA. CODE ANN. § 58-758 (1959).14 VA. CONST. art. XIII, § 183 (1902).
15 Sager, supra note 12, at 1332.
16 Citizens Foundation v. R.P.I., 207 Va. 174, 179, 148 S.E.2d 811, 815 (1966).
In this case a State college was in possession of the leased property; thus, there was
sufficient State control.
17 See Shaia v. City of Richmond, 207 Va. 885, 153 S.E.2d 257 (1967), discussed
briefly in Harris & Russell, supra note 3, at 1845.
18 Shaia v. City of Richmond, 207 Va. 885, 153 S.E.2d 257 (1967). It is interesting
to note that the lessees argued that their agreement with the hospital was not a lease
but a contract for services. The Supreme Court of Appeals, nevertheless, treated the
agreement as a lease.
19 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1382 (1964) (Additional Supp. 1966).2 0 VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1382 (1964) (Additional Supp. 1966).
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if there were an agreement as to the amount of local property taxes to be
paid by the lessee, this, in effect, could lead to a grant of tax immunity
to the industry.21 Furthermore, if the taxes agreed upon were considerably
lower than taxes on other industrial property, then the statute was repug-
nant to the General Levy and Uniform Taxation Clauses of § 168 of the
Virginia Constitution.22
It is nothing less than a truism to say that any agreement as to taxes,
in and of itself, violates the General Levy Clause of § 168. Yet the
Court's second contention as to tax uniformity requires amplification. The
Court contends that an agreement as to taxes will, in all probability, lead
to taxes for this particular leasehold interest which are not uniform with
the taxes that would have been assessed had the agreement not been made.
This argument implies that, if there were no agreement, the leasehold
interest would be taxed by the municipality in the same manner as other
industrial property.23 Section 168 of the Virginia Constitution, however,
refers to uniformity as to classes of taxable property,24 and it could be argued
that a leasehold acquired by an industrial authority for an avowed public
purpose is a distinct class of taxable real estate. It follows, then, that a
municipality might classify this leasehold interest distinctly for tax pur-
poses, with the result that taxes assessed thereon could be below that of
other industrial property, and remain within the constitutional limitations
of § 168. If the purpose of the agreement as to taxes provision of the
enabling statute was to entice industries to Virginia by means of a tax
break, the purpose might be fulfilled in this manner, consistent with the
Constitution. With the broad scope of the Suthers decision, however, muni-
cipalities may now feel that lessees of industrial authorities are not in a
distinct real estate tax class, and, therefore, the ramifications of Suthers
take on greater significance.
Other ramifications of the opinion must be viewed in the light of Vir-
21 Chesapeake Industrial Development Authority v. Suthers, 208 Va. 51, 61, 155
S.E.2d 326, 333 (1967).
22 VA. CONST. art XIII, § 168 (1902) provides in part as follows:
. . . all taxes, whether state, local, or municipal, shall be uniform upon the same
classes of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax and
shall be levied and collected under general law.
23 The Court also contended that there would be a lack of tax uniformity as to other
industrial authority leaseholds similarly situated. This argument ignores the entire
function of industrial development authorities. They are not created to provide new
sources of tax revenue for the localities, but to stimulate industrial growth and economic
activity. Furthermore, only the Authority and the municipality were to agree as to taxes,
not the various lessees, and the Authority could establish a uniform classification.
24 VA. CONST. art. XIII, § 168 (1902).
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ginia's inducements to out-of-state industry,25 and the establishment of
Industrial Development Authorities which have been consistently held to
be for a public purpose. 26 This acceptance remains unaffected by the
Suthers opinion. The Virginia Constitution specifically provides that the
General Assembly may allow localities to exempt manufacturers from tax
as an inducement.2 7 A few states, under appropriate statutes, exempt
land used for a public purpose,28 but businessmen and economic au-
thorities do not see the need for this type of incentive.p Businessmen do
not consider tax exemptions one of the five major inducements to industrial
location,30 nor were exemptions considered of major importance in an
advisory report to the Virginia State Legislature in 1957.31
Looking at the Suthers opinion, the Supreme Court of Appeals has
25 VA. CONST. art. XIII, § 189 (1902) reads as follows:
The General Assembly may, by general law, authorize the governing bodies of
cities, towns, and counties to exempt manufacturing establishments and works of
internal improvements from local taxation for a period of notexceeding five years,
as an inducement to their location.
S.J. Res. 11, 12, ACTS OF ASSEMBLY 1114 (1958) aimed at encouraging a "healthy
business climate in Virginia." See also Note, Legal Limitations On Public Inducements
To Industrial Location, 59 CoLuas. L. Rav. 618 n.6 (1959). From a historical view-
point the Colony of Virginia, in 1662, offered a bounty of five pounds of tobacco
for each yard of woolen cloth made in the Colony. Pinsky, supra note 3, at 266 n.4.
2 6 See, e.g., Fairfax Industrial Development Authority v. Coyner, 207 Va. 351, 150
S.E.2d 87 (1966) ; Cf. Harrison v. Day, 202 Va. 967, 121 S.E.2d 615 (1962) ; Harrison v.
Day, 200 Va. 764, 107 S.E. 2d 594 (1959). But see Button v. Day, 208 Va. 494, 158
S.E.2d 735 (1968), where the Supreme Court of Appeals held a fund established by the
State to guarantee loans for industrial projects to be a violation of the Credit Clause of
§ 185 of the Virginia Constitution. For a review of decisions in other jurisdictions, see
State v. Barczak, 34 Wis.2d 57, 148 N.W.2d 683 (1967).
2 7 VA. CONST. art XIII, § 189 (1902). Virginia's enabling statute was repealed in
1944.
2 8 See, e.g., Graf v. Warren, 10 Ohio St.2d 33, 225 N.E.2d 633 (1967); Appeal of
Allegheny County, 425 Pa. 578, 229 A.2d 890 (1967); Wayland v. Snapp, 334 S.W.2d
633 (Ark. 1960). In support of the arguments advanced in these cases, it should be
pointed out that, although the development authorities are created for an avowed public
purpose, it is the private industry which carries out that purpose. The industry provides
jobs and thereby reduces unemployment, and the industry boosts the economy, not the
authority.
29See Antieau, Municipal Power To Tax: Its Constitutional Limitations, 8 VAND.
L. RnV. 698, 734, 749-50 (1955); Stimson, The Exemption Of Property From Taxation
In The United States, 18 MINN. L. REv. 411 (1934); Garwood, Taxes And Industrial
Location, 5 NAT'L TAx J. 361, 365 (1952); Eiteman, Effect Of Franchise Taxes Upon
Corporate Location, 9 So. EcoN. J. 234 (1943); Steiner, The Tax System And In-
dustrial Development, BULL. NAT'L TAx ASS'N 98 (1938).
30 Garwood, supra note 29, at 368, lists markets, materials, labor, available sites and
plant facilities, and climate.
31 REPORT OF FISCAL STUDY COMMITTEE, ADViSORY COUNCIL ON THE VIRGINIA
EcONOMY 32 (1957).
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obviously weighed the needs of the localities against the inconclusive
showing of tax exemption benefits on industrial location. Analytically,
the Court's holding was a policy decision, built upon a strict interpretation
of those sections of the Virginia Constitution which provide for tax
exemption and uniformity of taxation. Although the effect of the Court's
opinion may be negligible as regards Virginia's inducements to out-
of-state industry, the opinion will provide new sources of tax revenue for
the localities. Yet, what the Court has overlooked in its zeal to enlarge
the scope of taxable real estate, is the primary purpose of industrial develop-
ment authorities. These Authorities serve to stimulate industrial growth
and boost the State's economy by encouraging industry to locate in Virginia.
In the past, it never has been the principal goal of industrial financing
programs (in Virginia or elsewhere) to produce tax revenue for the
localities.3 2 This still remains the attitude of industrial authorities, un-
changed by the Suthers opinion. The changes effected by Suthers will come
in the attitude of the Virginia General Assembly toward tax exemptions
on industrial location. In the past, the Assembly has considered tax exemp-
tions as a major inducement to out-of-state industry. For the future, before
it makes any major constitutional or legislative changes exempting industrial
authority leaseholds from taxation, the Assembly should remember that
tax exemptions are only an inducement to industry, not the inducement.
32 Pinsky, supra note 3, at 320.
